THE MARITAL DEDUCTION: QUALIFICATION OF THE
SURVIVING SPOUSE'S LIFE ESTATE
SECTION

2056 of the federal estate tax permits a marital deduction

for the value of a life estate created in the surviving spouse provided
the life estate includes a power of appointment' that is exercisable by the
surviving spouse alone and "in all events" in her favor or in favor of
her estate. Taxpayers have sought to take advantage of this deduction
by giving the surviving spouse a life estate with a power to consume the
property or invade the corpus of a trust. Whether such powers will
qualify the life estate for the marital deduction has been the subject of
considerable litigation.
In the recent case of Thomas J. Semmes 2 the deceased created a
testamentary trust in favor of his widow for life, remainder, if any,
to his children. His widow was given sole discretion in the management
of the trust and an unrestricted power to invade the corpus for her own
benefit. 3 The decedent's executor contended that, under Tennessee
law, the power to invade the corpus made the surviving spouse unconditional owner of the property and thus qualified her life estate for the
marital deduction.4 The Tax Court, however, strictly construed section
2056 of the Code and held that her power to invade the corpus failed to
qualify under Tennessee law as a power to appoint the entire interest in
'INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § zo 5 6(b)(5).
See generally LOWNDES & KRAMER,
FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXES, 791 (1956); Alexander, The Marital Deduction,
20 OHIO ST. L.J. 99 0959)' 32 T.C. No. 1i9 (Sept. 2.,

1959).
c"'The will provided as follows: cMy wife shall have sole power of management
and control of said trust property, and shall have sole power of management and control
of said trust property, and shall receive for her own benefit during her own lifetime all
the dividends and other income derived from said trust, and she shall have the right to
sell said stock and reinvest the proceeds of sale, at her discretion, trovided that she
must sell the whole of said stock when she elects to sell, and not retain any of this block
of 255 shares. Any reinvestment she may make of the proceeds of the sale, shall be
impressed with the same trust herein provided for. She shall have the sole right to
vote said stock at any stockholders meeting of the Semmes Bag Company, Inc. My
wife shall have the right to encroach upon the principal or corpus of said trust property
for her own benefit, at any time she sees fit, without accounting to my children, or their
representatives.' " The remainder was left to the children of the decedent- if none
should survive, then to the wife absolutely. Thomas J. Semmes, supra note a, at 1.
'The "unconditional owner" approach to the problem of what is an unlimited
power is discussed in Ralph G. May, 32 T.C. No. 38 (May z6, 1959). Treas. Reg.
1o5, § 81.47(a), contained this test.
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the trust: "Nothing in the will indicates an intention that the widow
could at any time dispose of the property by gift or appoint the corpus
to herself as unqualified owner." 5
Similar results have been reached in several cases in which the powers
of the surviving spouse dearly failed to qualify her life estate for the
marital deduction.6 These cases involved testamentary provisions to the
effect that the surviving spouse could consume the property for her
comfort, support, maintenance, or general welfare, or for some combination of these reasons. Such limited powers clearly fail to satisfy the
requirements of section 2056.' Similarly, a power to consume the property up to a certain sum is too limited to qualify.' Less obvious provisions that also fail to qualify the estate for the deduction allow the
surviving spouse to invade the corpus "for her happiness," 9 or grant her
the power to "sell, deed, or transfer"' 0 her interest. In these and other
cases involving unequivocally worded provisions to the effect that the
power to consume or invade is to be exercised as the spouse sees fit" or
with "uncontrolled discretion,"'" the courts have held that, because local
trust law required such powers to be exercised "in good faith" or
"honestly and fairly" for the protection of the remaindermen, such
fiduciary limitations were sufficient to disqualify the estate for the mari32 T.C. No. vig, at 4. "In Black v. Pettigrew, 38 Tenn. App. 1, 270 S.W.zd
x96, the court construed 'to have and to enjoy in any way she may deem proper' and
in Jones v. McMurrey, 25 Tenn. App. 47, 15o S.W.zd 713, the words 'to be used as she
sees fit.' In both cases such words, in the life tenants' grants, followed by gifts over,
were held to give each life tenant something less than an unqualified right to dispose of
the corpus." 32 T.C. No. 119, at 4.
6 E.W. Noble, 31 T.C. No. 86 (Jan. -8, 1959) ("maintenance, support and comfort") ; Estate of Tarver v. Commissioner, 255 F.zd 913 ( 4 th Cir. 1958) (her support
and support of the children in her discretion)5 Elwood Comer, 31 T.C. No. 123
(March 25, 1959) ("maintenance, comfort and general welfare") ; Michael Malamid,
22 T.C. 966 (954)
("for the way of life to which she and I have been accustomed").
'Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-5(a) ( 3 ) (1958).
6Willard Cummings, 31 T.C. No. 97 (Feb. I, 1959) (power to invade up to
$5ooo per year).
'Ralph G. May, 32 T.C. No. 38 (May z6, 1959) ("comfort, happiness and wellbeing"). Under New York law the power is not unlimited since only a "good faith"
exercise of the power would be allowed. Matteson v. United States, 147 F. Supp. 535
(N.D.N.Y., 1956). The New York law on the subject is summarized in Edward F.
Pipe, 23 T.C. 99 (1954); Pipe's Estate v. Commissioner, 241 F.zd zo (2d Cir. 1957);
Note, 71 HARV. L. REV. 381 (1957) ; Note, 57 COLUM. L. REv. 893 0957).
'oHarriet C. Evilsizor, 27 T.C. 710 (i957) ("sell, deed or transfer any or all ...
property").
" Commissioner v. Ellis' Estate, 252 F.zd io9 ( 3 d Cir. 1958).
"Pipe's Estate v. Commissioner, 241 F.2d 2io (2d Cir. 1957).
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the mere existence of a
tal deduction. 13 One court has even held that
4
remainder limits the exercise of the power.'
In disallowing the marital deduction, the courts have thus premised
their decisions upon the ground that the local trust or property law
imposed limitations upon the exercise of the power.'" In at least one
state, for example, the addition of a power of sale to a life estate does
not enlarge that estate to a fee simple. In a case in which the widow
held the power to "sell, deed, or transfer," this rule of property was
held to be a sufficient limitation upon the exercise of the power to disThe validity of such a construcqualify the estate for the deduction.'
of the 1954 Code, some
enactment
Following
is
questionable.
tion
7
authors, supported by the regulations,' contended that a nontechnical
power to appoint would qualify the life estate for the marital deduction
even though the power was not called a power of appointment by local
property law.' 8 Moreover, a Senate committee report implied that a
nontechnical power was intended when it stated that a power which in
substance and effect was a power to appoint would be sufficient "regardless of . .. local property-law connotations." 9 This is the same test
applied to section 2o4i of the Code, which pertains to the taxation of
powers of appointment.2"
The Regulations do not provide an adequate guide in this area. In
setting forth the requirement that a power of appointment must be exercisable in favor of the surviving spouse, the Regulations employ as an
example an "unlimited power to invade."'" Later, the same section of
the Regulations sets forth the requirement that the surviving spouse's
unlimited power to consume or invade must be accompanied by the
"3Commissioner v. Ellis' Estate, 257 F.zd io9 ( 3 d Cir. 1958); Ralph G. May, 32
T.C. No. 38 (May z6, 1959).
"'Delia Crawford McGehee, 28 T.C. 412 (1957).
" Commissioner v. Ellis' Estate, 252 F.zd 1o9 ( 3 d Cir. 1958); Estate of Tarver v.
Commissioner, 255 F.2d 913 ( 4 th Cir. 1958) 5 Pipe's Estate v. Commissioner, 241 F.zd
210 (2d Cir. 1957) ; Ralph G. May, 32 T.C. No. 38 (May 26, 1959); Elwood Corner,
31 T.C. No. 123 (March 25, 1959) 5 E. W. Noble, 31 T.C. No. 86 (Jan. 28, 1959),
Wallace S. Howell, 28 T.C. 1193 (1957) i Harriet C. Evilsizor, 27 T.C. 710 (1957),

Delia Crawford McGehee, z8 T.C. 412 (957);

Michael Malamid, zz T.C. 966

(1954).

"oHarriet C. Evilsizor, supra note 15, citing Tax Commission v. Oswald, io9 Ohio
St. 36, 141 N.E. 678 (1923).
"Treas. Reg. 1o5, § 81.47(a) (c) (i) 194.
aLOWNDES & KRAMER, op. cit. supra note i, at 412.
O S. REP. No. 1013, 8oth Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (948).

'°Treas. Reg. §zo.zo41(I) (b) (958).
"Treas. Reg. §2o.2o56(b)-5(g) (1)()

(1958).
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power to dispose of the property by gift "(whether or not she has the
power to dispose of it by will)."" This statement would seem to indicate that remainders were anticipated and approved.
The fact that local law labels the power a power to invade or consume rather than a power to appoint should not be fatal to the marital
deduction. Language should not be controlling. The Senate committee report on section 2o56 indicated that a power which in "substance
and effect" was a power to appoint would be sufficient to qualify for the
marital deduction regardless of the nomenclature used in creating the
power.23 At present, the Regulations 24 and dicta in a few cases25 provide that an unlimited power to invade will qualify the appointive
property for the marital deduction. In application, however, the courts
26
have been reluctant to find that such a power really existed.
In view of the committee report and the Regulations, it would seem
that, as a matter of construction, a reversal in the trend of judicial
authority is warranted. It would certainly be desirable, if for simplicity
alone, to employ a consistent definition of power of appointment
throughout the Code. Moreover, to adopt the broad definition of
power of appointment in section 2o4i would be more equitable in that
a single tax rather than a double tax would result. The property remains taxable to the estate of the surviving spouse under section 2041;
if the power to consume or invade is treated as qualifying for the marital deduction, then the payment of the tax will merely be postponed
until the death of the surviving spouse, which is the normal operation
of the marital deduction.
Presently, however, the courts are unwilling to adopt the definition
of a power of appointment in section 2041 of the Code because of what
2

" Treas. Reg. § 2o.zo56(b)-s(g)(3) (.958).
2'S. REP. No. 1013, 8oth Cong., zd Sess. 17 (194.8).
with regard to the Revenue Act of 1948, 62 Stat.
" Treas. Reg. § 2o.2.56(b)-5(g)(3) (1958).

The provision first appeared

1o.

2' Commissioner v. Ellis' Estate, 252 F.2d io9 ( 3 d Cir. 1958) 5 Stallworth's Estate

v. Commissioner, 26o F.zd 76o ( 5 th Cir. 1958)5 Pipe's Estate v. Commissioner, 241
F.zd 210 (2d Cir. 1957).

2' Commissioner v. Ellis' Estate, suptra note 25 ; Pipe's Estate v. Commissioner, sapra
note 25; Ralph G. May, 32 T.C. No. 38 (May 26, 1959); Delia Crawford McGehee,
28 T.C. 412 (1957).

In the Stallkuortlt case, supra note 25, the court allowed the marital deduction and
said that an unlimited power to invade or consume existed. However, the case is of
doubtful precedent in view of the fact that the will also contained an express power to
appoint as set forth in section 2o41, which would have been sufficient to qualify the
estate for the marital deduction quite independently of the power to invade or consume.
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they regard as the obvious import of the words of the statute."' As a
judicial change of construction seems unlikely, the statute should be
amended to provide unequivocally that the definition of a power of
appointment contained in section 2o4i shall also apply to section 2o56.
Such an amendment would resolve the inconsistency in the two sections,
obviate any uncertainty now posed by the cases and the Regulations, and
provide the draftsman with a definite standard.
With the law in its present state, the draftsman is best advised that,
although an unlimited power to invade the corpus of a trust, or to consume the principal of an estate, will qualify for the marital deduction,
the courts have followed local law to say that the power in any particular case is not really unlimited. Accordingly, the power to appoint
should be expressly granted to the surviving spouse if the marital deduction is desired."
"Pipe's Estate v. Commissioner, 241 F.zd z2o (2d Cir. 1957).
2' For alternatives to the use of the power of appointment, see LOWNDES & KRAMER,
op. cit. supra note x, at 8935 Alexander, supra note i, at xii.

